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arran gare
it is surely no coincidence that with the threat of a global ecological catastrophe 
there has been a resurgence of interest in the question ‘What is life?’ James Lovelock, 
for instance, who suggests that this catastrophe will leave only two hundred million 
people alive at the end of the century, has argued that the earth is different from other 
planets not only because it has life, but because it is a living being, raising immediately 
the question what is it to be a living being.1 He had argued that living beings have 
moulded the earth to produce the conditions for life, resulting among other things in 
an atmosphere consisting of reactive gases that are not at chemical equilibrium. it was 
on this basis that he held the earth to be a living entity, a form of life which regulates its 
chemistry and temperature to suit life. as a form of life it is sick.2 it has lost its resilience 
due to human activity and is undergoing a transformation to remove the cause of this 
sickness: most of humanity. that is, it seems to act with purpose. Lovelock’s claims 
were immediately contested. the response of mainstream biologists revealed their 
discomfiture at the questioning of a crucial assumption of mainstream science, that there 
is no real purpose in nature. as the famous proponent of sociobiology and orthodox 
science, richard dawkins, put it in The Extended Phenotype, the global ecosystem cannot 
be self-regulating because planets do not reproduce.3 teleology can only be entertained 
as shorthand for the forms of growth, organization or activity that have survived in the 
past because they facilitated survival and have been bequeathed to offspring through the 
darwinian process of reproduction, variation and natural selection. as such it is better 
characterized as ‘teleononomy’ than ‘teleology’ or ‘purpose’, and is only the appearance 
of purpose. in response, Lovelock showed how a self-regulatory system could develop 
without being the outcome of natural selection, illustrating this with a model of black 
     1. see James Lovelock, The Revenge of  Gaia, new york: Basic Books, 2006 and J.e. Lovelock, Gaia, oxford: 
oxford university Press, 1979.
     2. see James Lovelock, Gaia: The Practical Science of  Planetary Medicine, London: allen & unwin, 1991.
     3. on this and Lovelock’s response to it, see James Lovelock, ‘the gaia Hypothesis’ in Gaia in Action: Science 
of  the Living Earth, Peter Bunyard (ed.) edinburgh: floris Books, 1996, pp.15-33.
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and white daisies surviving differentially according to whether the earth’s temperature 
is hotter (favouring white daisies, which would then reflect more heat) or colder 
(favoring black daisies, which would then absorb more heat). Lovelock, along with 
Lynn Margulis, continued this argument by suggesting that the earth as a living entity 
has evolved through the development of increasingly complex forms of symbiosis and 
through ecosystems, including the global ecosystem, eliminating those organisms that 
foul their own nests.4 identifying such mechanisms provides support for Lovelock’s claim 
that the earth can be a self-regulating system maintaining the conditions for life without 
this having been the result of the darwinian mechanism of reproduction, variation and 
selection. However, it is clear from the debate between Lovelock and his opponents 
that deeper issues are involved. the argument reveals fundamental differences over 
what is science, what is an explanation, and more fundamentally, what is life, what is its 
significance, what is the place of humanity in the evolution of life, and how should we 
live our lives.
While Lovelock’s work is not at the centre of debates on the question of what is life, 
his work shows how consideration of our ecological predicament raises this question 
and shows that our entire conception of who we are and what is our place and role in 
the cosmos hinges on this question. further evidence for this comes from the work of a 
leading us biologist, edward o. Wilson. along with dawkins, Wilson had been a major 
figure in the development and promulgation of sociobiology which, in its dominant 
form, was the pinnacle of the synthetic theory of evolution. it sought to explain living 
organisms as nothing but machines for reproducing dna. that is, it effectively sought 
to explain life by explaining it away. the development and promulgation of sociobiol-
ogy was important in the advance of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism and for un-
dermining the quest for social justice, and it was attacked by radical biologists, such as 
richard Levins and richard Lewontin, for this reason.5 Later, Wilson became increas-
ingly concerned about the destruction of species and attempted to rally people to defend 
the diversity of life, although this concern made no sense from his previous reductionist 
perspective. subsequently, Wilson set out to promote ‘consilience’, the unity of knowl-
edge. While he still attempted to uphold central assumptions of mainstream science that 
there is a simple order accessible through the ‘scientific method’ underlying the diver-
sity of appearances in nature, he moved away from his earlier reductionism, offering 
some support for stuart Kauffman’s efforts to develop a notion of life as self-organising 
through complexity theory, grappling with the question of mind and its relation to the 
     4. see James Lovelock, ‘gaia: a Model for Planetary and cellular dynamics’, Gaia: A Way of  Knowing, 
William irwin thompson (ed.), great Barrington Ma: Lindisfarne Press, 1996, pp.83-87, and Lynn 
Margulis, ricardo guerro and Peter Bunyard, ‘We are all symbionts’, in Gaia in Action, Peter Bunyard (ed.), 
ch.12. 
     5. see r.c. Lewontin, steven rose, and Leon J. Kamin, Not in our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human 
Nature, new york: Pantheon Books, 1984 and richard Levins and richard Lewontin, The Dialectical Biologist, 
cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1985. for further developments of this argument, see also richard 
Lewontin and richard Levins, Biology Under the Influence, new york: Monthly review Press, 2007.
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body and arguing that that genes and culture co-evolve in the evolution of humanity.6 
thus the global ecological crisis has provided an intellectual environment favour-
able to deep questioning of our culture facilitating a revival of interest in the question 
‘What is life?’ this has been associated with a revival of interest in the philosophers, 
scientists and artists who in the past grappled with this question and with a much more 
critical attitude towards tendencies within culture that have suppressed such question-
ing. the role of mathematics in science, the role of models, assumptions about what 
is objectivity and what is subjectivity have all been brought into question, and all this 
questioning is brought into focus by the question ‘What is life?’  in fact, this question has 
implications for virtually every facet of culture, from how we understand science and 
its relation to the arts, the humanities and metaphysics and the way we understand the 
place of humanity in the cosmos, to the goals we set humanity. it forces those who con-
sider this question to appreciate that they themselves are living beings and part of life; 
that they are participating in the process by which life, at a crucial stage in its evolution, 
is reflecting upon and questioning itself. 
the papers in to this special edition of Cosmos & History, contributed by eminent 
thinkers from a diversity of disciplines and schools of thought, reflect the vitality of in-
quiry in this area. they give some indication of the profundity of the question and of 
its significance for humanity, and for the future of life. they also give some indication 
of the difficulties in addressing this question. any ‘utterance’, whether spoken or writ-
ten, presupposes assumptions by the producer of the utterance, including assumptions 
about what is assumed by the ‘receivers’ of the utterance. this becomes problematic 
when those making the utterances are based in different disciplines, different schools of 
thought, different metaphysical traditions, different countries and different continents. 
the ordering of these papers is designed to highlight the crucial issues at stake, to show 
the interconnections between the issues raised by these papers and their practical sig-
nificance, so as to stimulate further reflection on this topic. to appreciate differences in 
assumptions, however, it is first necessary to say something about both the contributors 
and their contributions.
the first paper ‘subjectivity and objectivity: a Matter of Life and death’ comes 
from gertrudis Van de Vijver and Joris Van Poucke of the centre for critical Philoso-
phy, ghent university. they argue that the question ‘What is life?’ arises as a symptom 
of the objectivistic/subjectivistic frame of thought which insists on being interpreted. 
the paper criticizes the prevailing tendency to address this question from an objectivist 
angle and invokes a Kantian transcendental approach, but criticizes past efforts in this 
direction for failing to transcend the objectivism/subjectivism opposition. the argu-
ment is presented through an examination of robert rosen’s critical reading of erwin 
schrödinger’s book, What is Life?, supporting thereby rosen’s argument that it is neces-
sary to develop a new epistemology and a new metaphysics.7 this paper continues Van 
     6. see edward o. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of  Knowledge, new york: alfred a. Knopf, 1998.
     7. see robert rosen, Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of  Life, new york: 
columbia university Press, 1991.
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de Vijver’s work on the philosophy of biology, with a particular concern to give a place 
to final causes along with other causes in the science of complex dynamical systems, in-
tegrating not only developments in complexity theory but hierarchy theory and biosem-
iotics, while reviving and reformulating transcendental philosophy.8 
this paper, along with the paper by Marcello Barbieri, are placed first because in 
my view these two papers taken together spell out most clearly and straightforwardly 
the significance and the problematic nature of this question (although to gain a full pic-
ture of the complexity of this question these two papers should be read in conjunction 
with the last paper by Murray code). While most of the contributors in some way strug-
gle to transcend the opposition between the objectivist and the subjectivist perspectives, 
it is possible to identify those who begin to address this question from the subjectivist 
side and those who begin to address it from an objectivist perspective. these two papers 
illustrate the opposing starting points. in doing so, Van de Vijver and Van Poucke also 
gives some indication why increasing attention is being paid to the radical thinking of 
rosen, while Barbieri’s paper gives some indication why biosemiotics has become such 
an important area of research. the opposition between these two papers thereby pro-
vide a preliminary organizing principle for what follows. 
Barbieri begins his paper ‘Life is semiosis’ with a careful analysis of the nature and 
significance of the question ‘What is life?’, and while defending semiotics, addresses 
this question from a objectivist perspective. Barbieri is the editor of the new Journal of  
Biosemiotics and has recently published two landmark anthologies on biosemiotics.9 to 
appreciate the full significance of the prominent place Barbieri is now playing in the 
rapidly developing field of biosemiotics it is necessary to appreciate the contrast be-
tween the origins of biosemiotics and Barbieri’s own work. Biosemiotics as such was 
founded by thomas sebeok and Jesper Hoffmeyer, claus emmeche and Kalevi Kull 
(the copenhagen-tartu nexus) under the influence of Peircian semiotics and Jacob von 
uexküll. it was developed as a more radically anti-reductionist form of biology than the 
organicism of Joseph needham, c.H. Waddington, Levins, Lewontin and Kauffman. it 
was, as claus emmeche characterized it, a ‘qualitative organicism’.10 this inspired the 
development of an even more radically qualitative form of biology, biohermeneutics, by 
s.V. chebanov in Moscow and anton Markoš and his colleagues in Prague utilizing the 
hermeneutic philosophy of Hans georg gadamer. Barbieri, President of the italian as-
sociation for theoretical Biology, and an eminent theoretical biologist apart from his in-
volvement with biosemiotics, is an unapologetic mechanist in the tradition of descartes, 
Manfred eigen, freeman dyson and graham cairns-smith. He has claimed that Peir-
cian biosemiotics provides no explanations. However, he is not a reductionist, pointing 
     8. apart from references in this paper to her work, see also gertrudis Van de Vijver, ‘identification and 
Psychic closure: a dynamic structuralist approach to the Psyche’ in Closure: Emergent Organizations and 
their Dynamics, Jerry L.r. chandler and getrudis Van de Vijver (eds), annals of the new york academy of 
sciences, Vol. 901, new york: the new york academy of sciences, 2000, pp.1-12.
     9. Macello Barbieri (ed.) The Codes of  Life, dordrecht: springer, 2007; and Marcello Barbieri (ed.), 
Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis, dordrecht: springer, 2008.
     10. c. emmeche, ‘does a robot have an umwelt’, Semiotica, 134(1/4) (2001): 653-693, p.657.
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out that mechanisms have emergent properties, and he argues that mainstream biol-
ogy has to introduce, along with information and structure,  ‘meaning’ into biology.11 
He has attempted to do this by showing the central role and diversity of ‘codes’ in living 
organisms and defining semiosis and meaning through his characterization of codes. 
the present paper furthers Barbieri’s argument, responding at the same time to chal-
lenges to it, firstly from mainstream biologists whose assumptions rule out any place for 
biosemiotics, but also from more qualitative biosemioticians such as Markoš.12 in doing 
so Barbieri is not only showing that mainstream biology must recognize the importance 
of biosemiotics but is working towards a rapprochement with the qualitative organicists 
by offering a broader notion of semiotics within which their work can be situated. Bar-
bieri begins with codes associated with the manufacture of objects and their organiza-
tion into functioning structures without any interpretation involved, allowing that com-
plex kinds of semiosis involving interpretation can have evolved from this. in this way, 
Peircian semiotics, which gives a central place to interpretation, is treated as a special, 
third kind of semiosis. challenging those anti-reductionists who dismiss the importance 
of mechanistic explanations, but marginalized by mainstream science, Barbieri’s work 
provides a challenge to reductionists that is virtually impossible for them to ignore, while 
providing the foundation for explaining the emergence of Peircian semiosis, including 
semiosis associated with mind and language.
the difference between these two papers requires some comment. as noted, Van 
de Vijver and Van Poucke, despite their concern to transcend the objectivist/subjectiv-
ist opposition and to overcome the dogmatic subjectivism characteristic of Kant’s tran-
scendentalism, take the subjectivist side of this opposition as their reference point, while 
Barbieri, despite his concern to give a place in biology to ‘meaning’, takes the objectivist 
side of this opposition as his reference point. one might hope that there would be a con-
vergence between the two approaches. i think this is the case, but it is not straightfor-
ward. rosen’s work which is central to the argument of Van de Vijver and Van Poucke 
is a sustained attack on reductionist, mechanistic thinking, on the surface of it, totally 
at odds with Barbieri’s defence of mechanistic explanations. However, Barbieri is surely 
right to discriminate between reductionism and mechanism. as Michael Polanyi point-
ed out half a century ago, machines can only be understood in relation to the purpose 
for which they are made and operated, and require at least two levels of explanation to 
account for their existence.13 Barbieri’s notion of code emerging through the interaction 
between two different processes could be taken as a development of Polanyi’s argument. 
on the other hand, rosen is revealing and attempting to overcome deeper reduction-
ist assumptions built into the mathematical models of mainstream science, which, he 
     11. M. Barbieri, The  Organic Codes. An Introduction to Semantic Biology, cambridge: cambridge university 
Press, 2003, p.ix.
     12. anton Markoš et.al. ‘an epigenetic Machine: review of Barbieri’s The Organic Codes: An Introduction to 
Semantic Biology’, Sign Systems Studies, 31(2) (2003): 605-616.
     13. see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, chicago: university of chicago Press, 1958, p.359ff, and 
Michael Polanyi, ‘Life’s irreducible structure’ in Knowing and Being, Marjorie greene (ed.), chicago: 
university of chicago Press, 1969, ch.14.
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argues, has created a surrogate world blind to life itself. although the language is simi-
lar, Barbieri and rosen are really talking about different things. rosen does give a place 
to mechanistic explanations, but following nicolas rashevsky, goes on to argue that it 
is also necessary to understand ‘life itself ’ to comprehend the teleology of these mech-
anisms, and this is more than the sum of all these mechanisms. However, rosen was 
thinking of mathematical models of mechanisms, and this is somewhat different from 
what Barbieri understands mechanisistic explanations to be. if rosen had addressed 
the issue of semiosis more generally through the new epistemology and metaphysics he 
was developing (rather confining himself to the study of models) he might have bridged 
the gap between gertrudis Van de Vijver and Joris Van Poucke on the one hand and 
Barbieri on the other. at the same time he might have furthered the efforts of biosemi-
oticians to bridge the gap between Pattee’s physical explanation for the possibility of 
signs, Barbieri’s work on codes independent of interpretation, the Peircian biosemiotics 
of Hoffmeyer, emmeche and Kull, and the work of the biohermeneuticists. However, 
despite his early collaboration with Howard Pattee, who has been working since 1965 to 
provide a physical explanation for the possibility of semiosis,14 rosen in his later work 
left his successors with the task of integrating a fully developed theory of semiosis into 
his theoretical scheme.
the next paper by arran gare, ‘approaches to the Question “What is Life?”: rec-
onciling theoretical Biology with Philosophical Biology’ also grapples with the objec-
tivist/subjectivist opposition. the approach adopted here is firstly, historical, examining 
efforts to overcome this opposition, first from the subjectivist standpoint, beginning with 
Hans Jonas, edmund Husserl, von uexküll and Maurice Merleau-Ponty and ending with 
Markoš, and then from the objectivist standpoint, beginning with  Max delbrück, niels 
Bohr and schrödinger and ending with rosen. as with Van de Vijver and Van Poucke, 
much of this paper is devoted to explicating and evaluating the work of rosen, although 
with a different intent. rosen’s analysis of the limitations of mainstream science and ef-
forts to overcome these limitations through a radical rethinking of mathematics are ex-
amined and evaluated. it is argued that the limited success in overcoming the failures 
identified justifies a return to the philosophy of friedrich schelling who, it is suggested, 
began the modern tradition of process metaphysics as well as being an influence on both 
semiotics and hermeneutics. schelling, it is claimed, saw as clearly as anyone the need 
to overcome the subject/object opposition and his philosophy of nature, privileging 
process (or ‘productivity/product’), was an effort to find a starting point for understand-
ing the world more primordial than subjects and objects from which these could be seen 
to have co-emerged. from the perspective offered by this process metaphysics the claim 
of Kauffman and Markoš, that to comprehend the creativity of the world mathematics 
ultimately must be subordinated to stories,15 is defended.
     14. see Howard Pattee, ‘irreducible and complementary semiotic forms’, Semiotica, 134(1/4) (2001): 341-
358. on the relationship between Pattee and rosen, see Howard H. Pattee, ‘Laws, constraints, and the 
Modeling relation – History and interpretations’, Chemistry and Biodiversity, 4 (2007): 2272-2295.
     15. see anton Markoš, ‘in the quest for novelty: Kauffman’s biosphere and Lotman’s semiosphere’, Sign 
Systems Studies: 32.1/2, 2004, 309-327.
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the fourth paper, ‘towards a science of Life as creative organisms’ by norm 
Hirst, is the point of departure for the following paper by floyd merrell. Hirst’s paper, 
which is partly autobiographical, describes an intellectual adventure to find a place in 
a scientific world for values and meaning. What this adventure revealed was that main-
stream science, mathematics, logic and philosophy mutually support each other to pro-
mote a comprehensive materialist world-view that has no place for meaning or creativ-
ity. in this journey Hirst discovered the work of rosen, and concluded, as rosen had, 
that a new metaphysics is required. in this paper he uses Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction’ to 
justify the speculative presentation of an alternative, process organismic world-view, a 
form of process metaphysics. While strongly influenced by alfred north Whitehead and 
scientists influenced by him (especially the biophysicist Mae-Wan Ho), it is an original 
synthesis. this synthesis is then contrasted with ‘materialism’. this contrast highlights 
the way apparently diverse ideas cohere as total perspectives, thereby displaying not 
only that what are often regarded as obvious, theoretically neutral ideas actually part 
of and even provide the foundations for a particular perspective of the world, but the 
real alternatives between perspectives. against the background of the account of ma-
terialism, Hirst argues that advances in biology herald the move towards a process or-
ganismic world-view. However, this is being blocked not only by mathematical ideas, 
but more fundamentally by mainstream ideas in logic. in identifying blockages to this 
revolution in thought Hirst is particularly concerned with the influence of extensional 
logic, which, like the mathematical formalism attacked by rosen, effectively eliminates 
meaning and creativity. What is called for, he argues, is a new logic adequate to the 
creativity of life.
the Peircian semiotician floyd merrell has recognized in rosen’s and Hirst’s critique 
of mainsteam thought justification for his own philosophy as a solution to problems they 
have revealed. in a massive trilogy (Signs Becoming Signs, Semiosis in the Postmodern Age, and 
Signs Grow), merrell developed a coherent Peircian cosmology advancing Peirce’s most 
radical ideas on the semiotic nature of all reality, fusing the customary distinctions be-
tween life and non-life, mind and matter, self and other, appearance and ‘reality’. in his 
contribution Merrell further explicates Peirce’s philosophy, revealing how radical his 
ideas really were, and in doing so, offers the basis for the development of the kind of 
logic Hirst argued is required to understand life.
Wendell Kisner’s paper ‘the category of Life, Mechanistic reduction, and the 
uniqueness of Biology’ examines the problem of defining the specific nature of life 
through Hegel’s categories. Kisner is specifically concerned to expose and free biology 
from residues of mechanistic categories. However, this paper does far more than this. 
the revival of interest in Hegel has been for the most part associated with an appre-
ciation of his continuing relevance to social and political philosophy. Kisner shows that 
Hegel’s Science of  Logic and Philosophy of  Nature are not only historically interesting; they 
have relevance for contemporary debates in the philosophy of nature and in the sci-
ences. the paper examines the relationship between Kant and Hegel, pointing out that 
Hegel’s Logic is not merely an epistemology but an ontology, arguing against Heidegger’s 
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interpretation of Hegel before going on to explicate the Logic. this explication reveals 
the profundity of Hegel’s critique of cartesian categories, how cartesian thought can be 
overcome and what Hegel then offers to biology. 
Kisner’s paper on Hegel’s philosophy is followed by a critique by andrew taggart 
of John Mcdowell’s Mind and World. While taggart places Mcdowell work squarely in 
the context of german idealism, he also points out its naturalism and its concern to re-
enchant nature.  While commending this naturalism, taggart argues that more is re-
quired to re-enchant nature than the ‘therapeutic’ or ‘stoical’ solution Mcdowell recom-
mends. He calls for the cultivation of ‘a form of dialectical thought that can better face 
the deeply social and and historical disunity between mind and world.’ taggart then 
offers an Hegelian inspired attempt in this direction.
a feature of the questioning of prevailing reductionist materialism is the revival 
of interest in and reassessment of the romantics, and along with them, of the impor-
tance of the humanities and arts in cognizing the world. it is now recognized that the 
romantics were not anti-enlightenment but, against the mainstream enlightenment 
thinkers, were promoting a subtler form of rationality which gave a place to feeling and 
emotion, and were developing a more dynamic view of nature. Kathleen o’dwyer in 
her paper ‘the Question of Love’s Possibility explored through the Poetry of William 
Wordsworth’ shows the poetry of Wordsworth to be not only a significant expression of 
literary romanticism, but a significant contribution to human knowledge, human un-
derstanding and human development. through a study of Wordsworth’s examination 
of the role of love in human living, obstacles to it and its necessity for human flourish-
ing, o’dwyer argues for a broader interpretation of romanticism than has previously 
been considered.
in ‘Quantum uncertainty, Quantum Play, Quantum sorrow’ david a. grandy 
takes as his point of departure the efforts by quantum physicists to characterize life. fol-
lowing evelyn fox-Keller he argues that the discovery of dna threw very little light on 
‘the secret of life’. examining the reflections on life by erwin schrödinger, niels Bohr 
and Max delbrück , grandy points out the subtlety of Bohr’s work and the significance 
of the discovery of indeterminacy in the quantum realm for understanding life. He 
argues that quantum uncertainty plays an essential role in the elemental life experi-
ences of random play and of compassionate sorrow. these experiences give a place to 
‘unscripted novelty, fresh variation, and far-flung sympathetic interconnection’ allowing 
‘inner and outer feeling experiences to grow back together.’
seán Ó nualláin, a major figure in the development of cognitive science and author 
of The Search for Mind: A New Foundation for Cognitive Science, has contributed a paper on 
the foundations of biology. it is, as he notes ‘a ground clearing exercise’ extending the 
notion of causation to include final and formal causation along with efficient causa-
tion. aligned with Barbieri’s paper but more wide-ranging it grapples with the problem 
of understanding the most basic forms of symbolic operations of organisms, arguing 
that there is interaction between metabolism and symbol-processing at all levels of life. 
the conclusions are radical: ‘darwin must be sacrificed for the sake of the stupendous 
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theory of evolution which is emerging.’ However, this paper, like much of the author’s 
work, is far more than a contribution to biology. it grapples with political issues and the 
problem of grounding ethics. Ó nualláin concludes: ‘it is possible to develop a politics 
based on the integrity of ecosystems as long as it is realised that our capacity for symbol 
use, and our very selves are also part of nature. to assert a ‘green’ politics is also to assert 
the finest heights of human culture, and its extraordinary perennial search for the abso-
lute grounds of its own existence.’ 
the contribution from Peter corning is also wide ranging, continuing his work 
of several decades of developing a holistic form of darwinism recognizing the central 
place of symbiosis and functional synergy in the evolution of life. He recently expound-
ed this in his book Holistic Darwinism.16 this paper, like Barbieri’s  and Ó nualláin’s, takes 
its starting point from an objectivist perspective within mainstream science, but going 
beyond this, advances ideas that have not been properly recognized in mainstream sci-
ence to develop a more adequate conception of life and its evolution. in particular, the 
work builds on those critics of social darwinism who revealed the ubiquity of symbiosis 
in nature. corning develops the analysis of symbiosis much further, showing how the 
development of functional synergies can account for most of the evolution of life. 
Helena Knyazeva from the institute of Philosophy of the russian academy of sci-
ences presents a distinctive theory of the self-organization of complex systems to ex-
plain, as the title of the paper indicates, ‘the riddle of Human Being’. What is privi-
leged in this version of complexity theory are the laws of co-evolutionary development 
of structures characterized by different speeds or rates of development, along with laws 
of assembly of wholes from parts where some elements of ‘memory’ (dna, cultural tra-
ditions etc.) are essential. this approach reveals a number of paradoxical consequences, 
such that a part (for instance an individual) might be more complex than a whole (so-
ciety) and why in changing an individual to reconstruct society it is still necessary to 
preserve in the individual the supposed undesirable past. the subtitle of this paper, ‘a 
Human singularity of co-evolutionary Processes’ alludes to a theory of singularity as 
a moment of instability in a phase transition. according to this theory (influenced by 
ilya Prigogine and isabelle stengers) the actions of one individual can determine which 
path of development is taken, and contribute to the emergence of a new pattern of col-
lective behaviour. finally, drawing on work on non-linear dynamics by members of 
the Keldysh institute of applied Mathematics of the russian academy of sciences, it 
is argued that in certain evolutionary regimes the future can have a direct influence on 
the present.
robert arp is the author of Scenario Visualization, an argument that humans gained 
evolutionary ascendancy through their distinctive capacities to synthesise apparently 
unrelated concepts, hypothesize, invent and take advantage of serendipitous opportuni-
     16. see Peter a. corning, Holistic darwinism: synergy, cybernetics and the Bioeconomics of evolution. 
chicago: university of chicago Press, 2005 and P.a. corning, the synergism Hypothesis: a theory of 
Progressive evolution., new york: Mcgraw-Hill, 1983. 
cosMos and History10
ties.17 Here he offers a general account of living organisms as hierarchical ordered proc-
esses that maintain homeostasis at different levels ‘through their abilities to internally 
exchange data, selectively convert data to information, integrate that information, and 
process information from environments.’ this characterization is developed and de-
fended through an engagement with mainstream biologists, philosophical biologists and 
philosophers of mind as well as more radical theorists. the paper offers a careful analy-
sis of key concepts in philosophical biology and defends the reality of emergence.  
in ‘of Mice Moths and Men Machines’ susan schuppli is concerned to recognize 
diversity, and does this by pointing out the liberating effect of what does not obey the 
logic of the machine. through an historical study of how a moth was found interfering 
with the functioning of an early computer, the first actual case of a bug being found, 
schuppli shows how mutations are necessary for systems to change and evolve. the dy-
namic vitality of the moth interacting with the apparently lifeless machine pushed the 
machine to a state of chaos. chaos ‘is not only an animating force in the constitution of 
new systems but is necessary for the evolution of difference’, schuppli argues. this pro-
vides support for the quote from Henri Bergson with which she begins the paper: ‘in 
vain we force the living into this or that one of our molds. all the molds crack, they are 
too narrow, above all too rigid, for what we try to put into them.’
amien Kacou in ‘Why even Mind?’ examines the basis for valuing life, considering 
what is involved in justifying the view that life should be lived in the first place. it ex-
amines the work and ideas on the role of philosophy of the philosophers who have been 
concerned with this question: nietzsche, Heidegger, albert camus, gilles deleuze and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, and is primarily concerned to clarify the question ‘should life be 
lived?’ distantly inspired by Heidegger, its conclusion is that if we are committed to as-
signing a value to life in general then we should be able to say that life is good irrespective 
of its existence. 
in ‘How Lacan’s Ethics Might improve our understanding of nietzsche’s critique of 
Platonism: the neurosis & nihilism of a “Life” Against Life’, tim themi argues that La-
can’s critique of the Platonic idea of the sovereign good illuminates nietzsche’s project 
of exposing the metaphysics underlying the history of Western morality. that is, it can 
help expose the metaphysics that has turned life against itself, as presently manifest 
in the destruction of the global environment, including ourselves amongst its earthly 
inhabitants. 
Michael Zimmerman in ‘The Singularity: a crucial Phase in divine self-actuali-
zation’ is also concerned with the consequences of failing to question our culture and 
its assumptions about life, but sees a different, although related threat. He probes the 
vision of the future of those ‘posthumanists’ who, believing that we are leaving the past 
behind through nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics, and genetic engineer-
ing, proclaim a future in which ‘our civilization will … expand outward, turning  all the 
dumb matter and energy we encounter into sublimely intelligent – matter and energy.’ 
     17. robert arp, Scenario Visualization: An Evolutionary Account of  Creative Problem Solving, cambridge, Mass.: 
Mit Press, 2008.
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far from such a view of the world being entirely new, Zimmerman argues, it is really 
a re-working of ‘the long-standing christian discourse of “theosis” according to which 
humans are capable of being god or god-like.’ this is a vision in which god only be-
comes fully actual through the process by which humanity achieves absolute conscious-
ness, a vision exemplified by Hegel’s philosophy. in this case, however, our offspring, 
posthumans, will carry out this process. in the meantime, the consequences for humans 
could be, to put it mildly, frightening. this is really a different manifestation of life 
turned against itself. and as with global ecological destruction, this is not a vision of 
dreamers. it is a vision in the process of being realized.
Like many other contributors, Philip Henshaw is highly critical of darwinists who 
have identified the engine of evolution as the struggle for survival. He argues that or-
ganisms for the most part are ‘engaged in resourceful exploration, using what they find 
while avoiding conflict.’ However, Henshaw is more concerned to expose the defective 
way mainstream science investigates the world and the blindness this engenders, partic-
ularly when it comes to addressing environmental problems. this defect he ascribes to 
the tendency of biologists to emulate physicists, or, more fundamentally, ‘to adopt a self-
consistent model to represent a complex, inconsistent world.’ the consequence is that 
the independence, relative autonomy and diversity of organisms and their behaviours 
are ignored. that is, the life in things is ignored. echoing Whitehead’s warning against 
the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ (that is, ignoring the degree of abstraction in our 
concepts and then taking these abstractions for reality), Henshaw argues that we have to 
learn to understand that natural systems are different from our formal ideas of them. it 
is the failure to appreciate this, he argues, that is the cause of failures to manage systems. 
to address this problem, however, Henshaw proposes something new, that instead of 
taking our abstract models as reality or discarding our abstract models, we use abstract 
models to reveal life. as he put it, ‘a self-consistent model could become a sensitive de-
tector of differences, and a way to highlight the life around you.’ 
in ‘towards a Phenomenology of Life: castoriadis’ critical Naturphilosophie and the 
Project of autonomy’, suzi adams shows the contribution of cornelius castoriadis to 
the philosophy of life. castoriadis is presented as one of a number of french philoso-
phers inspired by the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and his late turn to the philos-
ophy of nature and ontology. these philosophers have revived philosophical biology 
and the philosophy of life. according to adams, castoriadis characterized life as auto-
poietic, that is, self-moving and self-creating, and then pointed out that if this is a cor-
rect characterization then the whole cosmos is in some sense living. the emergence of 
‘existential life’ or living organisms, including humans, is then seen as co-emergent with 
the ‘world’ as a new mode of being. in this way castoriadis examines the ontological 
preconditions of ways of being-in-the-world, including autonomous being. according 
to adams, this amounts to a critical rethinking of Naturphilosophie, the anti-mechanistic 
tradition of science (inspired by schelling), in the service of castoriadis’ wider project of 
developing a philosophy of autonomy.  
the last paper, Murray code’s ‘Life, thought, and Morality: or, does Matter really 
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Matter?’ offers another radical critique of mainstream thought, and of all the contribu-
tors, is most resolutely opposed to scientific objectivism. such objectivism has blinded us 
to the ‘quickness’ of life, and is most responsible for the ‘bad sense’ which dominates the 
modern world, code argues. code began his career as a mathematician before becom-
ing a philosopher. as a philosopher he turned first to the thought of Whitehead, writ-
ing an explication and defence of Whitehead’s philosophy of mathematics,18 and then to 
Peirce, defending Whitehead and Peirce together in opposition to the ‘logicism’ of main-
stream philosophy as represented by Bertrand russell and Willard van orman Quine.19 
in his most recent work he has sought to develop a ‘subtle dialectic’ which can free us 
from the learned stupidity which has devalued life.20 this contribution furthers this 
work. in defending life, code does not attack reductionism or mechanism in science, 
but the privileging of science and its abstract concepts. He critiques ‘modern, science-
centered naturalism’ for its ‘moral laxity’. drawing on the work of coleridge, nietzsche, 
deleuze and Merleau-Ponty as well as Whitehead and Peirce, code reveals the radical 
implications of Whitehead’s philosophy as a means for cultivating ‘good sense’. as recent 
expositors of Whitehead have pointed out, Whitehead differs from the ancients in hold-
ing that the advance into the future is not merely reordering of what is, but creation, and 
such creation, code points out, requires imagination. imagination is not only ‘fancy’, 
but as Kant argued, is essential to knowing, and more fundamentally still, as coleridge 
argued, is an essential component of the becoming of the world. imagination is a natu-
ral power necessary for combining the intellect, the moral and the aesthetic aspects of 
living and thinking. that this is the case is illustrated by an analysis of Hannah arendt’s 
study of adolf eichmann, someone, arendt showed, who was totally deficient in imagi-
nation. code argues that Whitehead, understood as reviving an essentially nonmodern 
reason connecting in a ‘coherent, consistent, and intelligible language the meanings of 
difficult ideas that are inescapably vague’, more akin to poetry than science, provides the 
theory of actuality that coleridge lacked. responding to nietzsche’s challenge and his 
call for cultural therapy, the paper argues that a vital culture requires a well-cultivated 
collective imagination for a ‘healthy morality’ capable of overturning the nihilism en-
trenched in modern thought. 
as noted in introducing the first two papers, these provide an ordering principle for 
this entire double edition. following these two, the papers which follow first are those 
which tend to take a subjectivist perspective as their point of reference for grappling 
with the question ‘What is life?’, or at least critique objectivist approaches. Beginning 
with grandy’s paper on the implications of quantum theory, subsequent papers take 
more of an objectivist perspective as their reference point. However, there in anoth-
er principle of ordering also involved. although most papers are to some extent con-
     18. Murray code, Order & Organism: Steps to a Whiteheadian Philosophy of  Mathematics & the Natural Sciences, 
albany: state university of new york Press, 1985.
     19. Murray code, Myths of  Reason: Vagueness, Rationality and the Lure of  Logic, new Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1995.
     20. Murray code, Process, Reality and the Power of  Symbols: Thinking with A.N. Whitehead, Macmillan: Palgrave, 
2007.
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cerned with the practical consequences of our understanding what is life, those more 
centrally concerned with these consequences have been placed towards the end. for 
this reason, code’s contribution, which is most resolutely opposed to scientific objectiv-
ism and would otherwise have been placed near the beginning, has been placed at the 
conclusion. of the essays deemed most concerned with orienting us for action, those 
which are mainly concerned with the consequences of a defective understanding of life, 
such as Zimmerman’s, are placed first, while those primarily concerned to offer guid-
ance for overcoming such defective thinking, follow these. the concluding papers in this 
section are adam’s paper on castoriadis and code’s paper. castoriadis and code are 
most concerned with using their philosophies of life to launch new visions for the future, 
each giving a central place to imagination in the creation of the future. although adams 
in this paper has been more concerned to explicate castoriadis’ philosophy of nature 
than his theory of the imaginary institution of society and his project of autonomy, and 
code does not mention castoriadis, there is a striking similarity in their diagnoses of 
the disease of modern civilization and the importance they accord to imagination in 
overcoming this disease. 
apart from these dimensions there are other themes that unite different contribu-
tions. rosen’s critique of mainstream biology, the rapidly expanding field of biosemi-
otics, complexity theory, the importance of metaphysics in general and Whitehead in 
particular, the importance of the romantics, including schelling, coleridge and Words-
worth, and their subsequent influence, the ideas of Hegel, the diagnoses by nietzsche 
and Heidegger of the sickness of modern civilization, and the relative importance of 
mathematics, science, art and poetry, or of abstract thought and feeling, in cognizing 
the world, are each themes taken up by different contributors. for the most part, con-
tributions complement each other, but there are also differences between them. apart 
from the subjectivist/objectivist opposition, there are major differences between rosen 
(as expounded by a number of contributors), Henshaw and code on the capacity of 
mathematical models to grasp life, with rosen arguing for a radically different kind of 
mathematics to characterize life itself, Henshaw offering an original suggestion for how 
the deficiencies of models can be turned to advantage to reveal life, and code suggest-
ing that scientific naturalism has had far too much influence and should not be taken 
seriously as a point of departure for appreciating the quickness of life. there are also 
implicit differences in visions for what kind of future we should strive for implied or pro-
posed by different papers. and there are issues raised but not addressed by the juxtapo-
sition of these papers, ranging from questions about the relationship between different 
thinkers of the past, such as schelling, Hegel and Peirce, given that we know that Peirce 
was strongly influenced by both schelling and Hegel, to current theoretical and philo-
sophical questions such as the relationship between mathematical models, explanation 
and creativity. these might have been more explicitly addressed had these papers been 
presented at a conference. However, these papers were submitted independently of each 
other, and what is more extraordinary is their coherence. they admirably demonstrate 
that the question ‘What is life?’ is crucial to understanding the world and our place 
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within it, for understanding the deficiencies of our culture and civilization, and for en-
visaging a better future. Perhaps their greater value is in the questions they raise than 
the questions they answer.
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